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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past generation, the policy strategy referred to as affirmative action has 
retained its status as one of the most controversial issues confronting our society.  
The intensity of the debate continues to rage.  Advocates of affirmative action argue 
for the maintenance and expansion of these types of programs.  They suggest that 
affirmative action provides needed compensation for the victims of past injustices, is 
an effective method of addressing social and economic inequalities, and is the best 
approach to achieving non-discrimination.  These proponents point to lingering 
differences between the races in regard to employment earnings, and poverty as 
providing the justification for claims that only by taking into account one’s race can 
disparities be eliminated.4  Opponents of affirmative action contend that this policy is 
counterproductive, divisive, and ineffective.  They stress that affirmative action is 
discriminatory, fails to reward merit, denigrates individuals as a result of stereotying, 
and leads to enduring racism.5  The future of affirmative action has significant 
implications for the public and private sectors.  Its status will define or redefine 
policies in regard to job recruitment, promotion, and retention or termination; 
awarding of governmental contracts; training programs; educational opportunities 
and matriculation. 
The basic premise of this analysis is that the debate about the moral and ethical 
legitimacy of affirmative action may soon be made irrelevant by the impending legal 
imperative of affirmative action.  Affirmative action policies require legal legitimacy 
before they can be considered as viable programmatic options.  The legal 
environment of affirmative action has been uncertain since the inception of this idea.  
However, a series of recent court cases adjudicated throughout our nation suggest an 
inexorable resolution of the legal debate.  In addition, the United States Supreme 
                                                                
4See BARBARA BERGMAN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1966); Deborah Ballam, 
Affirmative Action:  Purveyor of Preferential Treatment or Guarantor of Equal Opportunity, 
18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (1997). 
5See Roger Clegg, Beyond Quotas:  A Color-Blind Vision for Affirmative Action, Policy 
Review, May/June 1998; PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RACE (1993). 
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Court seems to have developed a cohesive and compelling majority perspective in 
regard to this issue.  This legal definition of the issue will have a significant impact 
on the saliency of affirmative action.  It is the objective of this article to provide a 
legal analysis of affirmative action.  The ultimate goal is to suggest the types of 
programs that are permissible within the context of these constitutional and statutory 
mandates. 
This presentation of the legal future of affirmative action will be divided into five 
sections.  The material above serves as a general introduction to the issues.  The 
second section will review the origins and evolution of affirmative action.  This 
section will also attempt to provide a definition of this complex concept.  The third 
will provide a detailed analysis of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.6  
Bakke represents the Supreme Court’s first attempt to resolve the legal complexities 
of affirmative action.  The Court’s holdings in Bakke have shaped the debate for over 
20 years.  The fourth segment of this chapter will review current affirmative action 
case law.  Close attention will be paid to emerging legal distinctions essential to an 
accurate application of affirmative action principles in the future.  Within this 
section, close attention will be paid to current controversies such as California 
Proposition 209 - the state constitutional amendment which outlaws the use of 
affirmative action, Hopwood v. State of Texas,7 nonminority students who challenged 
a law school’s affirmative action admissions program, and Taxman v. Board of 
Education of the Township of Piscataway,8 a teacher’s challenge to a school board’s 
affirmative action plan of retaining minority teachers over nonminority teachers in 
regard to layoff decisions.  The last section will explain the Ohio Experience with 
affirmative action. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:  THE “BENIGN  
DISCRIMINATION” MOVEMENT 
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marks the inception of the 
affirmative action debate.  As John David Skrentny notes in his book The Ironies of 
Affirmative Action:  “Race problems and race inequality look very different when 
discrimination laws are on the books than when they are not on the books.  Simple 
racist exclusion was such an obvious problem that it consumed the energy of the 
civil rights groups and the attention of the sympathetic public.”9  With the attainment 
of legal equality which provided equality of opportunity the question for civil rights 
groups became whether this accomplishment was sufficient.  The dilemma for civil 
rights advocates was whether to rejoice in the hard fought victory for color blind 
laws or to pursue new goals.  For many the optimism which followed the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act “quickly dissipated.”10  Social realities illustrated that equality of 
opportunity did not insure equal living conditions, adequate health care, high 
                                                                
6Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
7Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
8Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
9JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 69 (1966). 
10Edward Erler, The Future of Civil Rights:  Affirmative Action Redivivus, 11 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 26 (1997). 
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incomes, meaningful employment, and a good education for minority citizens.  
These disparities were as apparent as before. 
It is within this context that the concept of “affirmative action” first emerged.  
Reflecting the nature of the times this term is very complex and has numerous 
meanings.  As civil rights evolved so did the concept of affirmative action.  
Originally, the term was utilized to express aggressive nondiscrimination or a strong 
commitment to equality of opportunity for all regardless of race or ethnicity.  It 
meant “public policies that afforded individuals opportunity without 
discrimination.”11  President Kennedy was the first public official to use this term in 
the context of racial discrimination when he signed Executive Order No. 10,925 in 
1961.  This order advocated equality of opportunity while directing public 
contractors to adopt nondiscriminatory employment practices.  The Executive Order 
stated: 
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for 
employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin.  The 
contractor will take affirmative action to insure that applicants are 
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without 
regard to their race, color, or national origin.12   
Following the issuance of this order “some two hundred fifty federal contractors” 
adopted voluntary affirmative action compliance programs which modified their 
existing employment practices.13 
As cynicism and dissatisfaction grew despite the attainment of legal equality, 
affirmative action took on a new meaning.  Affirmative action would represent any 
measures “beyond simple termination of a discriminatory practice, adopted to correct 
or compensate for past or present discrimination. . . .”14  This approach promotes 
special or preferential consideration of defined or targeted groups that have been the 
victims of discrimination.  The goal of this type of affirmative action represents a 
significant shift from equality of opportunity to equality of outcome.15  “Affirmative 
action programs can range from aggressive recruiting and remedial training 
programs, to setting goals and guidelines, to set asides and quotas specifying an 
exact number or percentage of admissions or jobs for blacks, women, and other 
minorities.”16 
While there is significant public support for the color-blind principle of equal 
opportunity, public acceptance of affirmative action targeted toward “special 
consideration” or “equality of outcome” has never been high.17  Even civil rights 
leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. were ambivalent about the future of 
                                                                
11Anthony Platt, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 67 (1997). 
12Clegg, supra note 5, at 13. 
13Ballam, supra note 4, at 9-10. 
14Platt, supra note 11, at 72. 
15See PAUL JOHNSON ET AL, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 151 (3d ed. 1994). 
162 DAVID O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1315 (3d ed. 1997). 
17SKRENTNY, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
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affirmative action.  As social unrest and dissatisfaction increased governmental 
leaders searched for viable alternatives.  Ironically, shortly after the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act, our nation experienced the worst urban rioting in history.18  Expert 
commissions appointed by the President to study urban unrest recommended the 
promotion of quota systems and affirmative action as a solution.  President Johnson 
relying on these types of suggestions set a new agenda as exemplified in his often 
quoted speech at Howard University: 
(F)reedom is not enough.  You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by 
saying: ‘Now you are free to go where you want and do as you desire, and 
choose the leaders you please…’  This is the next and the more profound 
stage of the battle for civil rights.  We seek not just freedom but 
opportunity.  We seek not just legal equality but human ability, not just 
equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a 
result….  To this end equal opportunity is essential, but not enough, not 
enough.19 
Inspired by this oratory and agenda, administrative agencies assumed a 
prominent role in the promulgation of the new affirmative action programs.  
Numerous examples of bureaucratic pronouncements and regulations aimed at 
promoting the next stage of civil rights exist.  Edward Erler observes how the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission assiduously wrote “guidelines, not indeed to 
achieve equality of opportunity but equality of result” while in the hands of the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance “affirmative action became a thinly disguised 
code for racial quotas and goals”.20  David O’Brien notes how the Department of 
Labor in 1967 “adopted a policy of preferential hiring for minorities and women and 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) assumed responsibility for 
affirmative action in education.”21  By the 1970s O’Brien states that the (HEW) 
issued guidelines and threatened to withhold funds “from colleges and universities 
that failed to meet its hiring and admissions goals for blacks, women, and other 
minorities.”22  Unlike previous civil rights programs the new affirmative action 
agenda evolved in a piecemeal fashion.  As developed by these low visibility 
agencies, affirmative action moved civil rights  policy from one dedicated to being 
color-blind to one advocating significant color conscious decision making. 
Federal administrative agencies produced numerous affirmative action 
regulations and standards and imposed them upon the public and private sectors.  
However, little guidance was provided to those who were expected  to comply.  In 
response to these vague and often contradictory mandates thousands of affirmative 
action plans and programs were established throughout the United States.  The 
vagaries of affirmative action were being addressed in areas such as education 
admissions policy; minority contracting; workplace training; and workplace 
                                                                
18Id. at 71-76. 
19Erler, supra note 10, at 26-27. 
20Id. at 29-30. 
21O’BRIEN, supra note 16, at 1316. 
22Id. 
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decisions related to hiring, firing, and promotion.  The product of these actions was a 
vast array of policy approaches many of which provoked controversy and concern. 
As the social implications of these new affirmative action programs became 
apparent, the public and Congress (including many members who voted for and 
worked for the passage of the Civil Rights Act) began to question their legitimacy.  
How could students with higher grade point averages and standardized test scores be 
denied admission into undergraduate colleges and professional schools while 
students with lower scores were admitted?  How could employees with more 
seniority be laid off while those with less seniority were retained?  How could 
government reject the lowest and best bidder in favor of a more expensive and less 
experienced competitor?  Why is a poor Vietnamese-American less deserving of 
special consideration than an affluent African-American?  These difficult questions 
lead many to challenge the legal, moral, and ethical assumptions of affirmative 
action. 
Consistent with the objective of this article, the analysis to follow will focus on 
the legal challenges to affirmative action.  Legal critics of affirmative action 
programs believe that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act prohibit 
any consideration of race, ethnicity, and religion in an effort to promote a color-blind 
society.  Proponents of affirmative action did not contemplate the social disruption 
created by these programs and maintained that any discrimination that occurred was 
unintended.  The belief was that actions not motivated by discriminatory intent could 
be characterized as “benign discrimination” which does not violate the spirit of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act.  In response to these claims, 
opponents argued that discrimination against individuals whether they are white, 
male, Jewish, Japanese, or Irish is equally reprehensible and equally a violation of 
equal protection of the law.  There can not be any “good vs. bad discrimination;” it is 
all bad. 
Historical analyses of the Fourteenth Amendment suggest that its language and 
legislative history intended it to establish a color-blind society.23  Did the Civil Rights 
Act modify this interpretation?  A review of the legislative history and language of 
the Civil Rights Act leads to the conclusion that it too was intended to eradicate all 
discrimination based upon racial, ethnic, or religious considerations.24  Numerous 
articles and books have been written documenting that the Civil Rights Act and its 
titles explicitly advocated a color-blind perspective.  John David Skrentny writes that 
efforts to ensure a color-blind interpretation of the Act exist throughout the 
Congressional debate and are “well covered elsewhere.”25  He then quotes Senator 
Hubert Humphrey, the Senate floor leader for the Civil Rights Act, who in response 
to a question about the motives of the employment section of the Act responded: 
                                                                
23See, e.g., DOUGLAS KMIEC FOREWARD: THE ABOLITION OF PUBLIC RACIAL PREFERENCE-
AN INVITATION TO PRIVATE RACIAL  SENSITIVITY (1997). 
24See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992); ROBERT LOEVY, TO END 
ALL SEGREGATION:  THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1990); 
CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). 
25SKRENTNY, supra note 9, at 121. 
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Contrary to the allegations of some of the opponents of this title there is 
nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to 
require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 
“quota” or to achieve a certain racial balance.  That bugaboo has been 
brought up a dozen times; but it is nonexistent.  In fact the opposite is 
true, Title VII prohibits discrimination.  In effect, it says that race, religion 
and national origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing.  
Title VII is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and 
qualifications not race or religion.26 
Edward Erler points to the statements of Senator Joseph Clark, the floor manager for 
Title VII as being even more explicit than Humphrey’s.27  Senator Clark stated: 
Any deliberate attempt to maintain a given balance would almost certainly 
run afoul of Title VII because it would involve the failure or refusal to 
hire some individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.  What Title VII seeks to accomplish is equal treatment for all.28 
While stressing that the Civil Rights Act “bars discrimination against or preferential 
treatment in favor of ‘any individual or group’. . .” Eugene Volokh cites the 
statements of Representative Emmanuel Celler, the House of Representatives floor 
manager for the Civil Rights Act, who states a “court could not order that any 
preference be given to any particular race, religion, or other group but would be 
limited to ordering an end to discrimination.”29  Finally, Skrentny quotes the language 
of the Civil Rights Act itself to demonstrate that it does not condone “racial 
proportions in employment” and it in fact “prohibits such a concern”: 
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer 
. . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on account of 
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or 
percentage of persons of any race . . . employed by any employer . . . in 
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race 
. . . in any community . . . or in the available workforce in any 
community.30 
III.  REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE:  THE SUPREME COURT 
ENTERS THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 
The debate over the legality of affirmative action continued throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s devoid of a political resolution.  Citizens turned to the courts as the 
appropriate forum to resolve the legal dispute and to provide a clear and uniform 
direction.  Issues such as affirmative action are difficult for the Supreme Court 
                                                                
26Id. 
27Erler, supra note 10, at 26. 
28Id. 
29Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1345 (1997). 
30SKRENTNY, supra note 9, at 121. 
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because they are embroiled in political controversy, pose significant legal and moral 
dilemmas, and are cases of  first impression.  By the late 1970s, the Court could no 
longer avoid the issue. 
In 1973 and 1974, Allan Bakke, a white male applied to the University of 
California-Davis Medical School.31  Both times he was denied admission.32  Bakke 
discovered that the Medical School operated two separate admissions programs.33  A 
special admissions program reserved 16 of the 100 entering slots for disadvantaged 
members of certain minority races.34  A comparison of Bakke’s qualifications with 
students matriculated through the special admissions program revealed significant 
disparities.35  Bakke’s grade point average was 3.46 compared to the average of the 
1973 special admittees of 2.88, and 2.62 for the 1974 special admittees.36  A 
comparison of standardized MCAT scores revealed similar differences:  Bakke’s 
percentiles were 96% for the verbal versus 46% for the 1973 admittees and 24% for 
the 1974 admittees , 94% for the quantitative versus 24% for the 1973 admittees and 
30% for the 1974 admittees, 97% for science versus 35% and 37%, and for general 
information 72% versus 33% and 18%.37 
Believing that he had been discriminated against because of his race Bakke sued 
the Regents of the University of California in a state trial court.38  Among his legal 
causes of action he alleged a violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and his statutory rights under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.39  The state trial court held that the medical school’s 
special admissions program constituted a racial quota which did violate Bakke’s 
constitutional and civil rights.40  On appeal, the Supreme Court of California 
affirmed the trial courts holdings.41  The Regents of the University of California then 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.42 
The decision of the Supreme Court was awaited with great anticipation because it 
marked the first time the Court addressed the legalities of affirmative action.  Its 
holding would determine the boundaries of acceptable applications of this strategy, if 
any, and would impact numerous programs and individuals in our society.  The 
Court announced its sharply  divided decision on June 28, 1978.  All of the major 
issues were decided by a tenuous 5-4 vote.  The holding contained three distinct 
                                                                
31Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276 (1978). 
32Id. at 276, 277. 
33Id. at 277. 
34Id. at 275. 
35Id. at 278. 
36Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78. 
37Id.  
38Id.  
39Id. at 278. 
40Id. at 279. 
41Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280. 
42Id.  
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opinions, with none of the opinions garnering majority support in regard to the major 
issues.  Substantively, five members of the Court agreed; that the Medical Schools 
admission program was illegal, Bakke must be admitted, but that race could be 
considered as one element to be weighed fairly against others in the selection 
process.43 
To comprehend the practical and legal implication of the Bakke decision it is 
essential to understand the three factions which formed.  The Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun group, concluded that the Regents of California’s 
admissions process was constitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
“colorblind” and Title VI doesn’t prohibit preferential treatment.44  Chief Justice 
Burger, Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist relying solely on Title VI argued that the 
admissions program was illegal because it violated the colorblind standard of the 
statute and therefore it wasn’t necessary to even consider the alleged constitutional 
violation.45  Justice Powell issued his own opinion, but his holdings were the most 
influential because he constituted the deciding fifth vote in regard to the outcomes of 
all the significant issues.  Powell aligned with Chief Justice Burger’s faction and 
held that Bakke must be admitted and the Medical School’s admissions program was 
illegal (Powell contending it violated the Constitution as well as Title VI).46  
However, Powell aligned with the Brennan group when holding that race could be a 
factor in an admissions process.47   
For these reasons it is important to understand the logic of Powell’s  holding 
which has been relied upon by many public and private institutions as providing the 
bottom line guidance required for acceptable race conscious affirmative action 
programs.  Powell’s opinion has been referred to as the “cornerstone of affirmative 
action”.48  It must be reemphasized however, that although there were majority 
holdings in Regents of California v. Bakke, there was not a majority opinion for any 
of the significant issues.  In other words, from a legal perspective the justices could 
not agree as to the underlying legal justifications for their decisions. 
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court holding that Bakke must be 
admitted, and although the Medical School’s special admissions program was 
unlawful, race could be considered in an admissions program.49  In reaching these 
judgments Powell developed important distinctions and reached significant 
conclusions.  While addressing the constitutional issue raised in this case he found 
that the constitution is explicit in its language when it states “No state shall . . . deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”50  Based upon 
this language Powell reasons: 
                                                                
43Id. at 271. 
44Id. at 325, 326. 
45Id. at 408. 
46Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. 
47Id. at 289. 
48Lackland Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity Justification, 29 
TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1, 8 (1998). 
49Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289, 320, 325-26, 408. 
50U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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It is settled beyond question that the rights created by the first section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms guaranteed to the individual.  
The rights established are personal rights.  The guarantee of equal 
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and 
something else when applied to a person of another color.  If both are not 
afforded the same protection then it is not equal. . . .  Racial and ethnic 
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most 
exacting judicial examination. . . .  It is far too late to argue that the 
guarantees of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of 
special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded 
others.51 
Although, Powell believes the Constitution is intended to treat all equally, he 
does not interpret this perspective to be an absolute bar to all racial classifications.52  
However, for a program which considers race to pass constitutional scrutiny he 
believes the state must have a substantial interest that is legitimately served by this 
classification.53  For Powell, this must of course exist within the context of 
preserving individual equal protection.  In applying this standard to the facts of this 
case, Powell argues that the “fatal flaw” in the Regents of California’s admission 
program is its “disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”54  A public program based upon these standards can never pass 
constitutional muster when it summarily rejects any group of people based solely 
upon their race or ethnicity.55  This logic leads to the inevitable conclusion that all 
quotas are illegal. 
Powell accepts the argument offered by the Regents of California that a “diverse 
student body” may be a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
learning.56  But he cautions that this goal can only be embraced to the extent that it 
does not violate individual rights.57  Powell warns: 
Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a 
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous 
student body.  Although a university must have wide discretion in making 
the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional 
limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded.58 
Based upon this reasoning the problem with the Medical School’s admission 
program is that it focused exclusively on racial and ethnic diversity insulating the 
                                                                
51Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-91. 
52Id. at 289-90. 
53Id. at 320. 
54Id.  
55Id.  
56Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
57Id.  
58Id. at 314 
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applicants from comparison with all other candidates for admission.59  Powell 
suggests that programs which take diversity into account will only survive 
constitutional scrutiny if “race or ethnic background is simply one element - to be 
weighed fairly against other elements- in the selection process.”60  Applicants cannot 
be excluded from the admissions process based upon their race or not belonging to a 
particular race.61  This reasoning does not afford preferential treatment a large role, 
although unlike Chief Burger’s group it doesn’t completely dismiss it either. 
In contrast to the Powell opinion, the Brennan faction argued that the affirmative 
action program of the Medical School was constitutional.62  Government may use 
race conscious programs as long as they do not “demean or insult any racial group, 
but . . . remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice . . . .”63  The 
constitutional basis for their holding is the conclusion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not “colorblind.”64  The most intriguing articulation of this argument 
was provided by Thurgood Marshall who reasoned: 
[h]ad the Court been willing in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, to hold that 
the Equal Protection Clause forbids differences in treatment based on 
race, we would not be faced with this dilemma in 1978.  We must 
remember however, that the principle that the “Constitution is colorblind” 
appeared only in the opinion of the lone dissenter. . . .  It is because of a 
legacy of unequal treatment that we now must permit the institutions of 
this society to give consideration to race in making decisions about who 
will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige in America.65 
In addition, the Brennan group suggests that the purpose of Title VI is to make sure 
that federal finances were not used to support racial discrimination and it was not 
intended as a ban on all race conscious efforts.66  As further support for this 
perspective the opinion documents the promulgation of affirmative action regulations 
by federal agencies. 
Marshall’s interpretation of the Constitution seems fraught with contradictions.  
Clearly, the Court erred in 1898 when they imposed the “separate but equal” 
doctrine.  However, to then argue that because a tragic mistake was made (most 
probably motivated by political considerations), that we must perpetuate a race based 
interpretation of the Constitution is hard to justify legally.  Marshall also must 
believe that the proper reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it is colorblind 
or he would not be able to argue logically if not for Plessy we wouldn’t be faced with 
our current dilemma.  It is also important to remember that it was Marshall, who on 
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behalf of the NAACP argued in Brown v. Board of Education67 that the Constitution 
does not recognize race distinctions.  The ultimate problem with the rejection of the 
“colorblind” perspective is that it justifies a perpetuation of a political imperative 
over the legal imperative. 
In regard to the Brennan group’s reading of Title VI, it is not contradictory to 
argue that even if a clear purpose of that section was to insure funds were not being 
distributed in a discriminatory manner which required race consciousness this 
objective doesn’t sanction affirmative action.  Ensuring that all individuals receive 
their fair share of a benefit program regardless of race is very different than 
instituting an affirmative action program that denies individuals an opportunity to be 
considered solely because of their race.  Last, as the Burger faction argues the 
Brennan group’s legislative history ignores explicit statements embracing the 
“colorblind” rationale. 
The opinion of Chief Justice Burger’s group is by far the shortest, most succinct, 
and least encompassing.  In essence they maintain that the plain language of Title VI, 
as supported by its extensive legislative history, is dispositive of this issue.68  
Therefore, it is unnecessary to even consider constitutional arguments.  The 
following passages capture the essence of their opinion: 
In the words of the House Report, Title VI stands for the “general 
principle that no person . . . be excluded from participation . . . on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”  This same broad view of Title 
VI…was echoed throughout the congressional debate and was stressed by 
every one of the major spokesman for the Act . . . .  The language of the 
section is perfectly clear; the words that follow “exclude from” do not 
modify or qualify the explicit outlawing of any exclusion on the stated 
grounds . . . the proponents of the legislation gave repeated assurance that 
the Act would be “colorblind” in its application. . . .  The meaning of the 
Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear; Race cannot be the basis of 
excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.69 
Many insights can be drawn from the Bakke decision.  From a legal perspective, 
if this holding is the “cornerstone” of affirmative action, the status of this policy is 
fragile at best.  Owing to the fact that it was a 5-4 decision, and devoid of a majority 
opinion, it is surprising that it has managed to endure for over twenty years.  Its 
staying power is probably the result of many things:  the lack of a new consensus, the 
avoidance of further potential controversy, and judicial respect for the doctrine of 
stare decisis.  Based upon the Bakke decision it is difficult for public and private 
institutions to develop programs that address issues of race or ethnicity.  The holding 
provides little direction and the often quoted guiding principle it does posit—“race is 
but one element to be weighted fairly against other elements” is vague and represents 
the opinion of Justice Powell alone.70  Finally, the constitutionality of affirmative 
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action is still to be determined as the majority of the court did not address this issue.  
Powell in concert with Chief Justice Burger’s group were able to come to a legal 
conclusion based solely on Title VI considerations. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Burger Court remained sharply divided 
when addressing affirmative action programs.  Recently, the Rehnquist Court has 
seemed to adopt a significant change in perspective in regard to affirmative action 
and the utilization of race classifications in general. 
IV.  CURRENT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The Supreme Court in recent years has re-examined and redefined affirmative 
action in a number of important contexts.  Among some of the more important 
holdings of the Court are: the adoption of a more rigorous level of scrutiny -”strict 
scrutiny” - which all race conscious programs must now survive in order to satisfy 
constitutional dictates, the rejection of claims of societal discrimination as a 
justification for racial classifications, and the elimination of its deferential standard 
toward congressional affirmative action programs.71  These developments have 
seemed to inspire the lower federal courts and state courts to make even more 
fundamental challenges to affirmative action.  Many of the holdings of these courts 
appear even more restrictive than what is required by the Supreme Court.  Spurred 
by these actions, state legislatures - most notably California and Proposition 209 - 
have acted to eliminate all race and  ethnic classifications from the public domain 
through state constitutional amendments requiring a “colorblind” application of the 
law.  These legal dynamics have led many analysts to question the future of 
affirmative action.72 
A.  Recent Supreme Court Interpretations 
This review of current developments in regard to affirmative action programs 
starts with an analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions.  These decisions assume 
primacy because they are the most authoritative source of constitutional principle.  
Supreme Court holdings in regard to the Constitution are binding on all federal and 
state courts.  It is important to understand the Court’s perspective before juxtaposing 
the actions of other judicial bodies.  Two of the most significant race classification 
cases decided by the Court are the City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson73 and Adarand 
Constructors Inc. v. Pena.74 
J.A. Croson Company was a Virginia plumbing contractor which had bid on a 
city contract to install toilets in the jail.  Richmond had enacted an ordinance which 
required nonminority building contractors to subcontract 30 percent of all city 
                                                                
71See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) and City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
72See Paula Alexander Becker, Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination: Does 
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awarded projects to minority owned business enterprises (MBE).75  Croson was 
awarded the contract as the only bidder despite failing to attract any MBEs.76  Croson 
was finally able to subcontract to an MBE but at a price $7,000 higher than it had 
estimated.77  Richmond refused to adjust the contract price and instead reopened 
bidding.78  Croson sued Richmond alleging that the ordinance violated his 
constitutional rights.79   
The Croson case produced a number of important developments.  The Richmond 
MBE standard was patterned after a federal program that the Burger Court upheld, 
by a 6-3 vote, in the 1980 case of Fullilove v. Klutznick.80  When the Rehnquist Court 
held by a vote of 6-3 that the Richmond program was unconstitutional this was 
viewed by many as representing a significant shift in jurisprudence.81  A review of 
the opinion and the number of justices supporting the judgment does suggest a 
change in judicial philosophy.  O’Connor writing for the majority attacked the 
presumptions of the Richmond program: 
As this court has noted in the past, the “rights created by the first section 
of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the 
individual.”  The rights established are personal rights.  The Richmond 
Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed 
percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race.  To whatever 
racial group these citizens belong, their personal right to be treated with 
equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the 
sole criterion in an aspect of public decision making.82 
In contrast to prior decisions, a clear majority also rejected the idea that claims of 
“societal discrimination” or “past discrimination” would survive constitutional 
scrutiny.  The Court held that these concepts are deficient because they provide “no 
guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to 
remedy.83  It has no logical stopping point.”84  In other words these types of claims do 
not point to a specific alleged legal harm which makes it impossible to determine 
when a remedy is achieved. 
This case is noteworthy because for the first time the majority of the Court 
embraced the strict scrutiny standard for all Equal Protection Clause violations, 
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including benign racial preferences.  In adopting the strict scrutiny test the court 
argues that this approach will: 
“smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body 
is  pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
tool.  The test also insures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling 
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.  
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.  Unless 
they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.85 
This more exacting scrutiny standard clearly reflects a judicial desire to reserve race 
based classifications for the most deserving purposes such as to rectify specific 
instances of discrimination.  Broad remedial programs designed to address general 
claims of discrimination clearly will not be considered constitutional.  The Court’s 
disdain for preferential programs is further highlighted by dicta which suggests that 
Richmond should have first considered race neutral policies such as providing 
financing for the development of small firms to increase minority business 
participation. 
While this case challenges many of the central holdings previously maintained by 
Fullilove, it was not considered a repudiation of similar programs enacted by 
Congress.  The Supreme Court has applied a less rigorous standard of scrutiny - 
intermediate - in the Fullilove case in deference to federal legislative efforts.  In fact, 
the Rehnquist court in Croson, in response to claims by Richmond that its 
determinations deserved deference similar to those afforded to Congress, explained 
that only Congress was specifically authorized under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce its dictates.86 
The deference afforded to congressional programs by the Supreme Court lasted 
for only another five years.  In its decision in Adarand v. Pena87 the Court explicitly 
overruled Fullilove and a subsequent case that relied on its logic - Metro 
Broadcasting v. FCC (upheld the Federal Communication Commission’s policy of 
preferring minority applicants for radio and television licenses).  Adarand 
Constructors Inc. was a Colorado based company which specialized in the 
construction of highway guardrails.88  The nonminority company had submitted the 
lowest bid to serve as a subcontractor for Mountain Gravel which was the recipient 
of a Department of Transportation construction contract.89  Despite this bid, 
Mountain Gravel subcontracted with Gonzales Construction Co. - an Hispanic-
American company - because under the terms of the contract they received 
additional compensation from the federal government for hiring subcontractors 
certified as “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.”90  This provision 
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was included pursuant to requirements of the Small Business Act and the Surface 
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act.91 
Adarand filed suit claiming these federal incentives violated his equal protection 
rights as provided by the Fifth Amendment which applies to federal actions.92  
Justice O’Connor writing for the majority agreed and added that “all racial 
classifications imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must 
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”93  O’Connor, in imposing a 
uniform standard on all governmental actions, rationalized this holding by stating: 
Metro Broadcasting’s untenable distinction between state and federal 
racial classifications lacks support in our precedent, and undermines the 
fundamental principle of equal protection as a personal right.  In this case, 
as between the principle and “its later misapplication”, the principle must 
prevail.94 
This holding resulted in the application of the heightened standard of strict scrutiny 
to all governmental actions without exception.  As a result of this development the 
major legal issues left to be resolved in the affirmative action debate evolve from the 
application of the two prongs of the strict scrutiny test.  Specifically the questions 
become: What constitutes a “compelling interest”?  Can non-remedial objectives 
such as promoting diversity ever constitute a compelling interest?  And what is a 
“narrowly tailored program”?  The answer to these questions will shape the future of 
preferential programs in regard to their scope, content, and number. 
The broad application of the equal protection clause from the workplace setting, 
to educational admissions, to issues of voting and political representation has yielded 
some uniform standards.  The Court has held that claims of discrimination can 
provide a compelling interest only if the program is predicated upon specifically 
identified discrimination versus claims of society wide or past discrimination.  
Critics of this approach believe this standard makes it impossible to devise a viable 
race based program that will survive the inquiry.   
Justice O’Connor in response to this charge argued in Adarand that she wished to 
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”.95  Within 
this context, she cited the 1987 case of United States v. Paradise96 in which the Court 
found a history of forty years of discrimination that resulted in a workforce where 
none of Alabama’s 232 state troopers with a rank of corporal or higher were black.  
Based upon this information the Court agreed that a narrowly tailored race based 
remedy was justified.  Ironically, O’Connor cast a dissenting vote in this case 
arguing that, although there was a compelling interest, the remedy -that 50% of all 
promotions go to blacks-was not narrowly tailored.97  This finding raises the question 
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of what does a narrowly tailored program to address a compelling interest look like?  
Clearly, the Court disdains quotas while it has recommended race neutral remedies.  
The exact composition of narrowly tailored programs still remains to be determined.  
The Supreme Courts imposition of strict scrutiny, the difficulty of providing a 
compelling interest in race based programs, and the need for narrowly tailored 
programs suggest that it will be difficult for a number of programs to satisfy 
constitutional analysis. 
B.  Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway 
Changing directives provided by the Supreme Court have inspired the lower 
courts to address affirmative action issues in a more speculative manner.  Taxman v. 
Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway,98 is an example of an important 
case decided by a lower court that has significant implications for the affirmative 
action debate.  This case specifically considers the legality of a nonremedial 
justification — racial diversity for racial preferences.  It also illustrates the political 
dynamics of the issue. 
In May of 1989, the Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway decided 
to reduce the teaching staff in their Business Department at the high school by one.99  
The two least senior members of the department had an identical tenure record of 
nine years.100  In light of this fact, the Board turned to its affirmative action plan and 
consistent with its stated policies, considered the race of the teachers to assist in the 
termination decision.101  Based upon this consideration, they decided to lay off 
Sharon Taxman, who was white, and retain Debra Williams who was black.102  The 
Board conceded that their affirmative action plan did not have a remedial purpose-
there was not any prior discrimination that they were attempting to remedy.103  In 
fact, the employment statistics revealed that the percentage of black employees in the 
teaching category exceeded the percentage of blacks in the available work force.104  
The Board instead indicated that the sole purpose of the affirmative action policy 
was to promote “racial diversity.”105 
Sharon Taxman filed suit against the Piscataway Board of Education alleging 
reverse discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.106  The trial 
court, upon the facts of the case and its interpretation of the law, granted a summary 
judgment to Taxman.107  The Board of Education appealed this decision to the United 
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.108  The Court of Appeals was 
confronted with having to determine whether a nonremedial purpose such as racial 
diversity can be the basis for a compelling state interest.  The Third Circuit provided 
a broad application in affirming the holding of the trial court and stated: 
Given the clear antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII a non-remedial 
affirmative action plan, even one with a laudable purpose cannot pass 
muster.  Although we applaud the goal of racial diversity, we cannot agree 
that Title VII permits an employer to advance that goal through 
nonremedial discriminatory measures.109 
This holding instead of just dismissing the idea of “racial diversity” indicates that the 
only justifiable state interest in the area of public race programs is to remedy past 
discrimination.  This conclusion extends the logic of the Supreme Court further than 
necessary.  Piscataway appealed this decision to the Supreme Court which agreed to 
hear the case.110 
At this point, the politics swirling around the Taxman v. Board of Education case 
became intriguing.  The Justice Department of the Bush Administration aligned with 
Taxman and argued that a desire to promote racial diversity could not justify racial 
discrimination and racial preference.  When the Clinton Administration assumed 
power, his Solicitor General, Walter Dellinger, voiced support for the Piscataway 
School Board’s policy.  However, in dramatic development, the Clinton 
Administration changed its position and Solicitor General Dellinger actually filed a 
brief with the Supreme Court in support of Sharon Taxman.  As concern mounted 
about the possible outcome of this case, black civil rights groups, including the 
NAACP, financed a surprise out-of-court settlement with Taxman estimated at over 
$400,000.  Commenting on this development, the National Law Journal claimed that 
it is “rare for any case to be settled once the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the 
dispute, and virtually unheard of for third parties to direct the settlement.”111  These 
maneuverings suggest that the civil rights community sensed that the Supreme Court 
was on the verge of announcing a precedent setting ruling which would have 
severely limited the application of affirmative action.  The political strategy seems to 
be delay and hope that the prevailing legal perspective will change. 
The legal status which has resulted from all this maneuvering is that the states in 
the Third Circuit are bound by the Taxman holding while the rest of the nation is still 
free to develop their own interpretation of Title VII and subsequent Supreme Court 
rulings.  In other words, the constitutionality of race programs can vary from state to 
state.  This case also demonstrates how the lower courts are influencing the legal 
agenda. 
                                                                
108Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552. 
109Id. at 1550. 
110Piscataway Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997). 
111NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Nov. 22, 1997). 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/7
1998] FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 783 
C.  Hopwood v. Texas 
Hopwood v. State of Texas,112 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit in 1996, is an important case because it provides an evaluation of 
the evolution of affirmative action law since the Bakke decision in 1978.  The facts 
of this case were similar to those of Bakke.  The Hopwood case involves a legal 
challenge to the admissions program of the University of Texas School of Law by 
nonminority applicants.113  Specifically, the law school upon, receiving an 
application for admission, calculated the Texas Index (TI) which was a composite of 
undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and standardized law school admission 
test scores (LSAT).114  Based upon their composite, applicants were assigned to one 
of three categories: presumptive admit, presumptive deny, and a discretionary 
zone.115  This procedure was however, applied to African-Americans and Mexican-
Americans in a different and more preferential manner.  As the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted: 
In March 1992, for example the presumptive TI admission score for 
resident whites and non-preferred minorities was 199.  Mexican-
Americans and blacks needed a TI of only 189 to be presumptively 
admitted.  The difference in the presumptive deny ranges is even more 
striking.  The presumptive denial score for “nonminorities” was 192; the 
same score for blacks and Mexican-Americans was 179.116 
Based upon these standards, a minority candidate with a TI of 190 would be 
presumptively admitted while the same 190 score if achieved by a nonminority 
would place them in the presumptive deny category.  Aside from different 
admissions standards the law school established a segregated evaluation process, 
consisting of different committees with different admissions personnel, and 
segregated waiting lists. 
Cheryl Hopwood, a white applicant, applied for admission to the Law School in 
1992.117  Despite a GPA of 3.8 and a LSAT of 39, resulting in a TI of 199, she was 
denied admission.118  Hopwood and three other white applicants also denied 
admission, noting the separate admissions procedures, sued the law school alleging 
that the school’s affirmative action program violated their rights as protected by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.119  In reviewing this action, 
the Court of Appeals reconstructs Bakke.  The majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit 
does not just extend Bakke, it actually invalidates some of its major assumptions.  In 
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framing the constitutional issues addressed by this case, the court recites a number of 
familiar principles: 
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause “is to prevent the State 
from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of 
race”.  It seeks ultimately to render the issue of race irrelevant in 
governmental decisionmaking. . . . In order to preserve these principles, 
the Supreme Court recently required that any governmental action that 
expressly distinguishes between persons on the basis of race be held to the 
most exacting scrutiny . . . Under strict scrutiny analysis we ask two 
questions: 1) Does the racial classification serve a compelling government 
interest and 2) is it narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal?120 
According to the court, the two most significant justifications that the law school 
offered to legitimize these racial classifications was the need for diversity in regard 
to a student body and overcoming the effects of past discrimination.  To determine 
whether these reasons satisfy the rigors of a “compelling government interest” the 
Court of Appeals re-evaluated Bakke in light of recent developments.  The Fifth 
Circuit acknowledged that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke provided the original 
justification for recognizing “diversity” as a compelling state interest in education.  
To the astonishment of many legal observers, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
while reviewing the origins of the diversity rationale decided to reject entirely the 
legitimacy of Powell’s opinion: 
We argue with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by 
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a 
compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Powell’s 
argument in Bakke has never represented the view of the majority of the 
court . . . . Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding 
education state, that non-remedial state interests will never justify racial 
classifications.121 
These assertions shocked many in the legal community because the Powell opinion 
has been widely relied upon by many lawyers as an essential guide for the 
development of affirmative action programs.122 
The court in regard to the issue of recognizing past discrimination as a basis for a 
compelling government objective suggested that this standard could only be derived 
from the actions of the law school not the education system in general.  Based upon 
these premises the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the University of Texas 
School of Law’s admissions program was unconstitutional.  The conclusion of the 
court in this case is not as significant as the process utilized to reach the court’s 
decision.  The court of appeals could have just as easily concluded that this program 
was unconstitutional by applying the logic of Bakke.  Clearly, by the standards of 
that case, the law school had instituted an impermissible quota which rejected 
individuals on the basis of their race and was therefore not narrowly tailored.  Rather 
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than embracing the reasoning, the Fifth Circuit rejected Bakke and suggested an 
alternative method of constitutional inquiry.  This approach was particularly 
profound because it is generally understood that only the Supreme Court can 
overturn or redefine its binding precedent.  The practical effect of Hopwood is to 
challenge the constitutionality of numerous admissions programs throughout the 
nation.  Many colleges and universities have “relied upon the Powell opinion in 
Bakke as the blueprint for designing and operating a constitutionally acceptable 
affirmative action admissions process . . .123  Some Texas universities have already 
“adopted expanded admission criteria that are aimed at achieving diversity through 
race-neutral facts such as the socioeconomic history of applicants and the level of 
education of applicant’s  parents.”124 
D.  California Proposition 209 
The single most important development in regard to affirmative action programs 
was the passage of Proposition 209 in California.  This development could signal the 
end of most preferential programs based upon race and ethnic background regardless 
of future Supreme Court holdings.  Proposition 209 was a state initiative to amend 
the California Constitution, which stated that the “state shall not discriminate against, 
or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, 
color, ethnicity, and national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting.125 
This initiative provoked an intense and emotional campaign debate.  On 
November 5, 1996, this amendment was approved by a vote of 54.3% to 45.7%.  
White males favored the Proposition by 66% to 34%; and white females favored it 
56% to 44%.  African-Americans voted against the Proposition 73% to 27%; 
Hispanics opposed it by 70% to 30%; and Asians by 56% to 44%.126  The day after 
the election, several groups in opposition to Proposition 209 filed a complaint with 
the district court seeking a permanent injunction which would bar California from 
implementing the amendment.  The legal basis of this complaint was that Proposition 
209 denied racial minorities and women the equal protection of the law guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Consequently, it was void because it conflicted with 
Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The district court granted the 
injunction, but on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
the injunction was vacated.  The Ninth Circuit while reviewing the legal arguments 
in opposition to Proposition 209, expressed their contempt for these equal protection 
challenges: 
As a matter of “conventional” equal protection analysis, there is simply no 
doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional . . . . The ultimate goal of the 
equal protection clause is “to do away with all government imposed 
discrimination based on race.”  Proposition 209 amends the California 
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Interest Analysis in Striking Down an Affirmative Action Admission Program, 34 HOUS. L. 
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Constitution simply to prohibit state discrimination against or preferential 
treatment to any person on account of race or gender.  Plaintiffs charge 
that this ban on unequal treatment denies members of certain races and 
one gender equal protection of the laws.  If merely stating this alleged 
equal protection violation does not suffice to refute it, the central tenet of 
the Equal Protection Clause teeters on the brink of incoherence.127 
The Ninth Circuit filled its holding with language which rejected equal protection 
and Civil Rights challenges to Proposition 209.  For example, the Court emphasized 
that individuals do not possess a constitutional right to preferential treatment based 
upon race or gender, and impediments to “preferential treatment do not deny equal 
protection.”128  In another statement filled with sarcasm, the court reminded us that 
the “Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees does not 
require what it barely permits.”129  This resounding defense of the constitutionality of 
Proposition 209 emphasizes the importance of understanding its policy implications.  
This amendment will likely remain in effect for many years. 
Eugene Volokh’s extensive review of the practical implications of this initiative 
stresses that it applies only to the public sector (state and local governments, 
agencies, and instrumentalities) and that private sector actions are not affected.  
Therefore, all public sector preferential programs regarding employment, 
contracting, recruiting, and education are illegal: 
It doesn’t matter whether a prohibited criterion is the only factor, or one of 
many factors.  It doesn’t matter whether the program refers to “quotas” or 
“plus factors” . . . . It doesn’t matter whether its an admissions program, 
training program, or mentoring program.  Any government program that 
treats people different based on the prohibited criteria is forbidden.130 
Illustrating the distinction between public and private sector programs, Volokh noted 
that a race based scholarship is permissible at a private college but prohibited if 
established by a public college.131  While this example suggested that private 
preferential programs may endure it must be remembered that many of them were 
specifically instituted in response to public mandates.  It must also be emphasized 
that Proposition 209 does not prohibit programs which are implemented in response 
to identified past discrimination.  Actions that remediate constitutional violations of 
anti-discrimination law are permissible. 
The California amendment also does not invalidate any program which provides 
assistance or preferential treatment to individuals based upon non-suspect criteria 
such as income, educational opportunities, and single parent household.  Over twenty 
states and numerous local governments are currently considering the adoption of 
legislation similar to Proposition 209.132 
                                                                
127Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701-02 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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V.  THE OHIO EXPERIENCE 
The last section of this analysis will review the evolution of affirmative action 
principles in Ohio.  The evolving principles surrounding affirmative action have left 
governmental institutions and state actors with little guidance for developing 
programs to promote social inclusion within the context of existing and anticipated 
legal parameters.  The complexity of formulating Constitutional remedial programs 
is dramatically evidenced by the history of race-conscious programs in Ohio and 
their recent demise under strict scrutiny analysis.  The power of the state to enforce 
state-wide remedial legislation has been crippled, and the authority of state actors, to 
enforce remedial programs has been threatened.  The Ohio experience provides a 
warning that many existing affirmative action plans will not survive judicial scrutiny, 
and, that appointed and elected officials cannot be protected by qualified immunity if 
they have not conducted a predicate study prior to the initiation of affirmative action 
programs.  Recent developments construing affirmative action plans in Ohio 
illustrate the factors that cannot be relied on to support an affirmative action plan, but 
provide little guidance for promoting social inclusion within the diminishing legal 
parameters. 
State participation, active or passive, in racially discriminatory practices, was not 
foreign to the State of Ohio at the conception of the Civil Rights Act.  In 1967, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the State of 
Ohio was a “joint participant” in discriminatory practices of contractors and craft 
unions in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because it had no measures to 
ensure against the discriminatory practices of its contractors.133  The court enjoined 
the State of Ohio from awarding construction contracts until it obtained assurances 
from the contractors that equal job opportunities would be made available.134 
In a progressive attempt to eradicate discrimination in the awarding of state 
contracts, Ohio began enacting policies and legislation to promote social inclusion of 
minority business enterprises in the awarding of state contracts.  In 1972, Ohio 
Governor John J. Gilligan cited  Ethridge in an Executive Order that required all 
state agencies to “eliminate discriminatory barriers to employment and remedy all 
effects of present and past discriminatory patterns and practices including those 
relating to public works contracts.”135  In 1976, the Ohio Department of 
Transportation (ODOT) issued bid-specifications for a road construction contract 
that included a mandatory set-aside of two percent for minority business 
subcontractors, which was commended by a state court for its compliance with 
Federal Highway Administration regulations for minority participation.136   
In 1977, the Ohio General Assembly passed an appropriations measure requiring 
state agencies to adopt affirmative action programs and to invite minority business 
enterprises and small businesses to participate in certain projects for which 
                                                                
133Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967). 
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135Exec. Order of September 27, 1972. 
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competitive bidding requirements were waived.137  This measure survived 
constitutional review by a state court, however, the measure was not upheld until 
after it had expired by its own terms. 138 
In spite of Ohio’s affirmative efforts to end discrimination in the awarding of 
state contracts, as well as receiving approval by the judiciary for its efforts, the 
Jackson court found that discrimination remained in the awarding of public contracts 
by the State of Ohio.139 
This court finds from the evidence submitted that there exists in the 
awarding of state contracts a discrimination against the minority groups 
specified in [the Act].  The court finds that there is a compelling need to 
correct this discrimination.140 
Ohio’s efforts to institute policies, set-asides and waivers to encourage minority 
participation in the state contracts were clearly ineffective in eliminating 
discrimination, as evidenced by the state court’s finding of discrimination in 1979.141  
Against this backdrop, the General Assembly enacted a statute in 1980 which 
provided that a prime contractor on a state contract must “award subcontracts 
totaling no less than five percent of the total value of the contract to (MBE’s) . . . and 
that the total value of both the materials purchased from (MBE’s) . . . and of the 
subcontracts awarded . . . will equal at least seven percent of the total value of the 
contract. . . .”  142  The statutory provision additionally included a waiver provision 
for majority bidders who could demonstrate inability to secure minority participation 
in the subcontracting.143 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, following the dictates of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Fullilove144  upheld the constitutionality of this statute in 1983.  
Although strict scrutiny review had not yet been mandated by the Supreme Court, 
the Sixth Circuit specifically held that: “the compelling nature of the governmental 
interest in halting racial discrimination by the state itself is clear.”145 
The Sixth Circuit, finding a compelling government interest, noted that the Ohio 
General Assembly considered the following indicia of racial discrimination within 
the state’s bailiwicks in enacting the statute:  (1) the 1967 and 1979 judicial 
determinations that the state had been a “joint participant” in the exclusion of 
minority businesses from work on public construction projects; (2) a task force 
                                                                
137Ohio Legislative Service Commission Summary of Enactments, 112th General 
Assembly 4-7 (Nov. 1977). 
138Ohio Bldg. Chapter, AGC v. Jackson, No. 79-CV-01-247 (Franklin Cty. Common 
Pleas., Sept. 28, 1979). 
139Jackson, slip op. at 5. 
140Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
141Jackson, slip op. at 5.  
142OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 123.151 (c)(2)(b) (West 1980). 
143OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 1232.151(C)(3) (West 1980). 
144Ohio Contractors Ass’n. v Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983). 
145Id. at 170. 
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report covering the years 1975-1977 that showed that although minority businesses 
constituted 7% of all Ohio businesses they received less than 0.5% of state purchase 
contracts; (3) a Department of Administrative Services study showing that from 
1959-1975, the state awarded only 0.24% of its general construction contracts to 
minority businesses; and (4) an Ohio Legislative Budget Office report showing 
minority participation in ODOT contracts to be 0.13% in 1975, 0.3% in 1976, and 
0.18% in 1977.146 
When the Supreme Court of the United States implemented  strict scrutiny in its 
1989 Croson decision, it analyzed relevant statistical data necessary to evidence a 
discrimination by the governmental entity seeking to enforce remedial affirmative 
action.147  Justice O’Connor’s analysis approvingly made an example of Keip, which, 
as she noted, upheld a minority set-aside based on “the percentage of minority 
businesses in the State compared to [the] percentage of state purchasing contracts 
awarded to minority firms upholding [the] set-aside.”148 
The State of Ohio amended its statutory set-aside program set forth in Ohio 
Revised Code section 123.151, providing that: “the total value of subcontracts 
awarded and materials and services purchased from minority businesses shall be at 
least ten percent of the total value of the contract, wherever possible and whenever 
the contractor awards subcontracts or purchases materials or services.”149  In 1993, 
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny ruling in Croson, the General 
Assembly directed community college districts to comply with this set-aside 
provision.150 
A flood of litigation arose in Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the 
statutory set-aside provisions, as well as the policies of state agencies enforcing state 
law.   The result has led not only to the invalidation of Ohio’s set-aside programs, but 
the unavailability of qualified immunity as a defense for state actors enforcing such 
programs.151  Moreover, these decisions have left the debate open as to what factors, 
if any, would validate race-conscious measures in awarding public contracts. 
State and Federal courts were called upon to scrutinize the constitutionality of the 
Ohio statutory set-asides, and the policies enforced by state agencies and arms of the 
state in three separate but concurrent actions.  The first action was brought in state 
court by a Lebanese business owner challenging the State’s refusal to certify his 
company for set-aside contracts under state statute.152  The second action was also 
brought in federal court by an unsuccessful bidder against a community college 
challenging the college’s MBE and FBE policies, as well as the state statutes that the 
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147City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488 (1989). 
148Id. at 502. 
149OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ' 123.151 (C)(2)(a) (West 1990). 
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151F. Buddie Contracting, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Community College, 31 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590 
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policies enforced.153  Finally, a third action was brought in federal court challenging 
the state statute and the Department of Administrative Services’ enforcement of the 
set-aside provision in connection with a public construction project.154   
In Ritchey, the state trial and appellate courts pronounced the first major blow to 
the Ohio statutory set-aside framework.  The business owner in Ritchey had been 
denied recertification as a qualified MBE on the basis that the business owner, who 
was of Lebanese descent, was not “oriental” and not a member of any of the other 
minority groups listed in section 122.71 (E)(1) of the Revised Code.155  The appellate 
court held that the statutory provision defining minorities was unconstitutional as 
applied to the Lebanese business owner, because he was denied MBE certification 
solely on account of his race.156  While all three justices on the panel held that the 
business owner was wrongfully excluded from participation in the MBE set-aside 
program, one justice opined that the business owner fit the definition of “oriental” 
and that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue.157 
Of great consequence to the future of race-conscious remedial programs in the 
State of Ohio was the Ritchey court’s statement that:  “While remedying past 
discrimination may be a compelling interest, we find it hard to envision a situation in 
which a race-based classification is narrowly tailored.”158  The court did, however, 
propose that:  “the goal of the MBE program ideally should be maximizing the 
opportunity for all Ohio citizens who are economically or socially disadvantaged.”159  
Yet, if the judiciary cannot envision a race-based classification that is narrowly 
tailored, it is foreseeable that even an MBE program that considers economic and 
social disadvantage would not survive strict scrutiny. 
Identifying those MBE’s who can demonstrate the effects of discrimination by 
showing that they have suffered social or economic disadvantage would tend to more 
closely tailor the remedy to the identified discrimination.  However, if a minority 
business enterprise that does not fit within the definition of “minority” to qualify for 
participation in an MBE program could establish social and economic disadvantage, 
that minority business would be denied participation in the MBE program solely on 
the basis of race and the program would be underinclusive. Alternately, the program 
could be deemed overinclusive if a minority business enterprise can show social and 
economic disadvantage, but there is no evidence that the governmental entity 
discriminated against that particular racial group.  Moreover, the compelling interest 
standard requires governmental entities to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that 
it participated in the discrimination of minorities.  It could be argued that any 
remedial program benefiting minority business enterprises that have relocated to the 
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relevant market is not narrowly tailored because it does not remedy the identified 
discrimination against local businesses, regardless of the racial classification the 
minority business enterprise may be grouped.  Taking the court’s analysis to the 
extreme, the only race-conscious program that could survive constitutional scrutiny 
would be one that benefits only those minorities specifically identified as having 
been discriminated against by the governmental entity and who have been 
economically and socially disadvantaged because of the identified discrimination. 
In 1998, two federal district courts within the State of Ohio were called upon to 
examine the constitutional viability of the “set-aside” provisions of the Ohio Revised 
Code, as well as the policy of a community college district that enforced the 
statutorily mandated “set-aside”.160  At the time these cases were pending, there had 
not yet been a state Supreme Court decision rendering the state statute 
unconstitutional.  The Ritchey case was pending review by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit had previously upheld the statutory set-asides in Keip in 
1983.  While the Sixth Circuit in Keip did not implement the strict scrutiny standard, 
there was indication in the Keip decision that the State of Ohio had identified a 
“compelling interest” as there were judicial findings of past discrimination by the 
State in the awarding of state contracts.  Additionally, a legislature is presumed to 
know the status of the law when enacting legislation, which was confined to strict 
scrutiny analysis at the time the State of Ohio enacted the statutory provision, 
requiring community college districts to enforce the statutory set-asides. 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio addressed the following 
claims brought by an unsuccessful, non-minority bidder for a construction project by 
the Cuyahoga Community College (a “community college district” as defined by 
state statute):  (1) that the MBE and FBE policies of the College violated the 
Plaintiff’s equal protection rights; (2) that the state statute mandating the MBE and 
FBE policies violated the Plaintiff’s equal protection rights; and (3) that the state 
statutes were unconstitutional per se.161  The plaintiff brought the action against the 
College and its trustees individually; the State of Ohio was not a party to the 
action.162 
While the action was pending in the Northern District, the Federal District Court 
for the Southern District of Ohio was reviewing a direct challenge to the 
constitutionality of the state set-aside provision pertaining to a contract to be let by 
the State Department of Administrative Services.163  The plaintiffs in Drabik sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief against the State officials and the State to prohibit 
the enforcement of the set-aside statute in the letting of state construction projects.164 
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On October 21, 1998, the Northern District of Ohio entered its ruling upon the 
challenge to the policies and the underlying statutory mandates of the Cuyahoga 
Community College.165  The court refrained from ruling upon the constitutionality of 
the state statute, as the state was not a party, as well as the plaintiff’s challenge to the 
College’s FBE policy because the plaintiff’s bid had not been rejected on the basis of 
its failure to comply with the FBE policy.166  However, the validity of the state statute 
was necessarily reviewed by the court because the college was an arm of the state, 
enforcing state law.167  The court held that the college’s MBE policy, which mirrored 
the statutorily mandated set-aside provision, was unconstitutional as to both prongs 
of the strict scrutiny standard.168  Moreover, and most threatening to state officials 
throughout the state of Ohio, the court held that the individual defendants were not 
entitled to qualified immunity for their participation in enforcing the College’s set-
aside program and State law.169 
The Northern District noted several factors from which it concluded that the 
College did not have a compelling interest in enforcing remedial programs.170  The 
court discounted reliance on the evidence relied on by the State in enacting state-
wide set-asides.171  First, the court held that finding of discrimination by the state in 
the ‘60’s and ‘70’s and the statistical disparity studies of the ‘70’s were too remote to 
demonstrate the required need for remedial action.172  Secondly, the court held that 
neither the college nor the state demonstrated past discrimination by either 
governmental entity “within the area from which [the College] is likely to acquire 
contractors.”173  Disparity studies presented by the college were found insufficient 
because “they [did] not show MBE’s qualified and willing to undertake [the College] 
construction contracts but instead rely solely on disparity between all MBE’s and the 
distribution of contract dollars . . . .”174 
The Northern District further held that the college’s set-aside program was not 
narrowly tailored, finding that: (1) there was no evidence that the college or the state 
considered any race-neutral alternatives; (2) there was no time limit on the MBE set-
aside program that has been in place since 1982; and (3) there was no requirement in 
the policy that an MBE demonstrate that it has been the victim of past discrimination 
or that it was otherwise was economically disadvantaged.175 
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Only one week after the Northern District entered its decision, the Southern 
District of Ohio ruled that the State’s MBE set-aside statute was unconstitutional and 
permanently enjoined the defendant state officials from enforcing the state statute.176  
The court held that there was insufficient evidence of past discrimination or a 
remedial purpose by the State to support the set-aside program because: (1) current 
statistics only demonstrated the percentage of contracts actually awarded to MBE’s 
under the set-aside; (2) evidence of past discrimination and statistical disparities 
found in the 1970s were too remote; (3) there was no time limit on the set-aside 
program; (4) there was not a stated remedial purpose contained in the statute; and (5) 
the availability of waivers for non-minority firms was solely discriminatory.177 
In both federal cases, the defendants argued the constitutional validity of the state 
statutes, pointing out the statistical studies relied upon by the General Assembly 
when initially enacting the set-aside program in 1980, as well as judicial findings of 
past discrimination by the State as a joint participant with private industry.  Both 
courts found that the studies were outdated, and that the finding of discrimination in 
the 60’s and 70’s did not substantiate the appropriate nexus to the remedial actions of 
the State in the 90’s. 
The federal decisions ruling upon MBE programs in Ohio will substantially 
affect the future of remedial, race-conscious programs.  Developing a remedial 
program that will survive constitutional review is now uncharted territory in the State 
of Ohio with little more than a theoretical framework to guide government entities 
and state officials.  Perhaps the greatest hurdle facing the state as a whole, and public 
officials in the State of Ohio, is the Northern District’s pronouncement that state 
actors, enforcing state law, will be denied qualified immunity if the requisite studies 
do not support enforcement of race-conscious programs within the bailiwicks of the 
arm of the state.178 
In F. Buddie Contracting, the court held that the individual defendants violated a 
“clearly established right” and were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity for 
enforcing an MBE program mandated by state law which had not yet been 
invalidated by the State Supreme Court.179  While the court readily found a violation 
of a clearly established right, it grappled with the underlying question of whether 
discrimination by a state could justify the use of a set-aside by an arm of the state.  
Specifically, the Court stated:   
Although it is well-established that the past discrimination which 
establishes the compelling interest in affirmative action must have been by 
a governmental entity seeking to employ the affirmative action plan, it is 
not entirely clear to this Court that this means that a history of 
discrimination in the area of public construction contracts by the State of 
Ohio might not be considered sufficient to justify the use of a set-aside 
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program by an arm of the State, the College, without a showing of 
discrimination by that particularlized entity.180   
The factor that is “not entirely clear” is reconciling the decision that the state actors 
violated a clearly established right, when the court itself was uncertain whether 
discrimination by the state could justify the use of remedial measures by an arm of 
the state. 
Prior to the court’s decision in F. Buddie Contracting, the law provided no 
guidance with respect to which “governmental entity” was relevant in determining 
the existence of past discrimination to establish a compelling interest.  As a result, 
the college trustees relied on Ohio law, which prior to the Northern District’s 
decision was never declared unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court.181  Yet, the 
college trustees were found to have violated a clearly established constitutional right 
by enforcing existing statutory mandates.182  Therefore, the College trustees were 
denied qualified immunity, which shields government officials from liability if their 
conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”  
In Croson, the Supreme Court reviewed the ordinances of one municipality, 
which did not involve state mandate.183  The Supreme Court has not pronounced that 
a state has no power to remedy past discrimination throughout its jurisdiction.  Since 
the college is an arm of the state, and the trustees followed the dictates of existing 
state law, they should not have been held individually liable pursuant to Harlow.184  
However, federal precedent in the State of Ohio denies qualified immunity for state 
actors and rejects state-wide remedial programs on the grounds that:  “Allowing an 
arm of the State which has not been found to have discriminated in the past to 
remedy a history of discrimination by the State itself would be tantamount to 
requiring it to remedy broad societal discrimination, which would be an exercise in 
the tail wagging the dog.”185 
Interestingly, the court arrived at this opinion on the grounds that an arm of the 
state should not “be required to remedy the discriminatory practices of other 
departments of the state . . .” and that “an MBE could not sue [the College] for 
discriminatory contracting customs of the Ohio Department of Transportation.”186  
However, in a matter involving constitutional magnitude, this logic is wanting of 
constitutional analysis to justify infringing upon a state’s right to remedy 
discrimination within its own bailiwicks.  The state can only act through its arms, 
whether to discriminate, or to remedy discrimination.  The Court’s logic suggests that 
the state could not mandate the state entities to enforce remedial legislation to 
remedy the effects of past discrimination by the state.  This suggestion narrows the 
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possibilities for governmental entities to remedy past discrimination by leading to the 
logical extreme that a state must identify which of its departments, or arms, have 
specifically discriminated in the past or refrain from enacting remedial measures to 
address the effects of discrimination by the state. 
The Ohio experience evidences that structuring a race-conscious affirmative 
action program within the context of legal constraints will be a nearly 
insurmountable task.  A strong basis in evidence necessary to validate such a 
program would have to approach identification of those minority enterprises actually 
discriminated against by the governmental entity and lingering social and economic 
disadvantage suffered by the enterprise resulting from the discrimination.  However, 
establishing that the particular governmental entity discriminated against particular 
minority enterprises would be nearly impossible since set-aside statutes have been 
enforced for over a decade.187  Any predicate study would therefore conclude that the 
governmental entity has not participated in recent discriminatory practices.  The 
tenure of set-aside programs and the resultant inability to identify recent 
discrimination by the governmental entity eliminates the possibility of developing 
any affirmative action program that would survive strict scrutiny.  Such a result 
would lead to a return to the status quo that existed prior to the initiation of that 
entity’s affirmative action programs.  The difficulty in developing an affirmative 
action program to comply with the Supreme Court dictates was reflected in the State 
Appellate Court’s statement that:  “we find it hard to envision a situation in which a 
race-based classification is narrowly tailored.”188  
The Northern District questioned the validity of disparity studies showing the 
smaller size of MBE’s to evidence the affects of discrimination.189  Specifically, the 
court noted that while discrimination may cause MBE’s to remain relatively small, 
evidence of size disparity and “reverse causation” is “more than likely the result of 
societal discrimination which may have delayed the development of MBE firms 
thereby rendering the unqualified for bigger jobs and skewing statistics to show 
disparity between large and small firms as disparity between minority and non-
minority firms.”190   The Southern District of Ohio commended an executive order 
promulgated by Governor Voinovich that encourages the elimination of race-based 
criteria in assisting economically disadvantaged business.191 
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*5 (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 30, 1998). 
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The cumulative effect of the courts’ opinions in the State of Ohio is potentially 
devastating to the future of race-based affirmative action programs.  Entities or arms 
of the state will have difficulty demonstrating discrimination through disparity 
studies for two significant reasons: (1) MBE participation in state construction 
contracts has been evident over the recent years because of the State mandated set-
aside programs in existence since 1982; and (2) studies demonstrating statistical 
disparities in size, social and economic disadvantage may be deemed to be the result 
of “societal discrimination” thereby diminishing the likelihood of showing a strong 
basis in evidence of a compelling interest to remedy the effects of discrimination.192 
The judicial decisions within the state of Ohio have substantially narrowed the 
range of permissible programs designed to remedy past discrimination in several 
respects: (1) governmental entities may be required to show unsuccessful results of 
race-neutral alternatives; (2) an arm of the state may not be required to enforce state 
mandated affirmative action plans; (3) enforcing a remedial program without the 
“requisite,” but undefined, disparity studies, will result in personal liability for state 
actors; and (4) a program that does not link the effects of discrimination to those who 
actually were discriminated against by the state entity will not be narrowly 
tailored.193 
The most prudent method to address and promote social inclusion would be to 
consider and develop race-neutral alternatives.  In the area of contracting, 
governmental entities could target social and economic disadvantages, rather than 
race itself to promote MBE participation. Methods to be adopted could include 
waiving bonding requirements, offering financial and/or training and simplifying 
bidding procedures for those firms found to be socially and economically 
disadvantaged. Governmental entities may also consider providing incentives to 
contractors who utilize firms, or hire individuals, from the geographic area. 
Social inclusion may still be promoted through indirect means, such as funding 
programs that provide work training to underprivileged individuals. Educational 
institutions could provide incentives through financial aid or otherwise to applicants 
from urban schools or to applicants whose parents have not received post-secondary 
education. Targeting social and economic disadvantage at its core would assist the 
development of opportunities for those who continue to suffer the lingering effects of 
discrimination. 
Direct race-conscious policy strategies to promote social inclusion should be 
formulated with caution, and with many underlying factors taken into consideration 
to maximize the potential validity under strict scrutiny. Any remedial action taken by 
a governmental entity must be formulated based upon a showing of discrimination 
by the entity within the limited geographic area in which the governmental unit 
exists.  For example, arms of the state should not rely on state statutes mandating 
affirmative action programs, but instead examine the existence and effects of 
discrimination within the market in which the governmental entity specifically 
operates.  Moreover, minority firms should be required to demonstrate social and 
economic disadvantage.  Qualifying racial classifications should be limited to those 
                                                                
192See F. Buddie Contracting, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Community College, 31 F. Supp. 2d 571 
(N.D. Ohio 1998) and Associated General Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, No. CS-98-943, 
1998 WL 812241 (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 30, 1998). 
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groups who have been identified, by statistics or direct evidence, as subject to 
discrimination by the governmental entity. 
Determining the existence, or continuing effects of discrimination within the 
governmental entity’s bailiwicks requires extensive statistical analysis of the relevant 
market. The more narrow the statistical comparisons, the more likely they are to 
support a strong basis in evidence for the need for remedial programs.  For example, 
it would be prudent to compare the percentage of willing, and qualified, minority 
business enterprises within the specific industries and types of services contracted for 
by the governmental entity. This may require separate statistical comparisons for 
each type of contract let by the government to each identifiable racial classification. 
Such statistical analysis should be conducted on a regular and continuing basis to 
ensure the continued validity of the evidence demonstrating a need for remedial 
action. In addition, any race-conscious program should have meaningful waiver 
provisions and be of limited duration. 
The strict scrutiny analysis as applied to affirmative action programs requires the 
development of new policies, and perhaps new avenues, to promote social inclusion.  
Shifting the focus from race to social and economic disadvantage may provide a 
foundation for providing opportunities to those who are underrepresented due to the 
effects of societal discrimination. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
At the dawn of affirmative action, race-conscious programs were deemed not 
only constitutional, but required to ensure equal opportunity in fact, not just in 
theory.  Recent developments in the law suggest that affirmative action has reached 
the eve of its constitutional viability.194   
Affirmative action began with executive orders for government actors to require 
that contractors take affirmative action to ensure employment opportunities without 
regard to race.195  To enforce such mandates, the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance issued several regulations requiring contractors to implement plans to 
obtain the “goal” of minority utilization on a percentage basis.  Minority set-asides 
were mandated, enforced and upheld.  Contractors contesting affirmative action 
programs and set-asides were deemed to have “voluntarily” accepted the terms of the 
contract; courts consistently held that such objection to affirmative action 
requirements was in the nature of a contract dispute rather than an equal protection 
concern.  Judicial, legislative and administrative mandates required government 
officials to comply with set-asides and other race-conscious “goals;” all of which 
were upheld throughout the country.  The Supreme Court explicitly approved a 
federal set-aside program in the 1980 Fullilove decision.196  Permissible goals 
included remedying societal discrimination, increasing minority participation, and 
achieving racial diversity. 
                                                                
194See F. Buddie Contracting, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Community College, 31 F. Supp. 2d 571 
(N.D. Ohio 1998) and Associated General Contractors of Ohio v. Drabik, No. CS-98-943, 
1998 WL 81224 (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 30, 1998). 
195Exec. Order of September 27, 1972, (I believe there are additional ones cited in earlier 
portions of the article) 
196Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
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While it cannot be disputed that the effects of societal discrimination continue, 
the social, political, economic and judicial frameworks have so evolved as to 
drastically alter the viability of affirmative action within the existing context of equal 
protection jurisprudence. Over time, overt discrimination has diminished, but in turn, 
the nexus between remedial action and discrimination has become more difficult to 
define within constitutional parameters.  It was perhaps politically easier for the 
judiciary to approve of affirmative action when continuing acts and effects of 
discrimination were conspicuously pervasive.  Remedying societal discrimination or 
encouraging racial diversity remain laudable, but legally insufficient.  As it became 
more difficult to link remedy to specific harm, the opponents of affirmative action 
became increasingly successful in harnessing the “color-blind” Constitution, which 
had previously been interpreted to permit consideration of race as a factor in 
providing opportunities to individuals who had historically been denied equal 
opportunity in fact due to racial bias. 
Non-minorities have been increasingly successful in their challenges to race-
conscious remedial programs on the basis that programs that require minority 
inclusion without sufficient supportive studies have unconstitutionally excluded 
them on the basis of race.197  Ironically, a member of a suspect class asserting 
“unlawful discrimination” has been judicially required to prove “invidious 
discrimination”, i.e. discrimination due to stereotypes and prejudices associated with 
racial classifications.  Even in the cases in which members of suspect classes allege a 
discriminatory impact of race neutral decision-making, they are required to 
demonstrate significant statistical disparities between the inclusion of non-minorities 
and minorities.  Query today whether a member of a minority group who can 
demonstrate 90% exclusion of minorities in employment or government contracts 
could succeed in a discrimination claim against a government employer or prime 
contractor who cannot statistically demonstrate a compelling interest to sustain a 
10% minority set-aside under current affirmative action parameters. 
Throughout the evolving jurisprudence concerning race-conscious remedial 
programs, state actors have struggled to abide by the law of the day with little 
guidance as to their duties under the law.  When affirmative action was mandated, 
state actors were not instructed as to how to accomplish the goal of social inclusion.  
Over time, the judiciary upheld federal mandates, voluntary affirmative action 
programs, and minority set-asides.  State actors following the law, could rely on the 
“good faith” reliance on the law, and their efforts to promote diversity and inclusion 
were applauded.  As it became increasingly difficult to link remedy with 
discrimination, and as the judiciary heightened scrutiny of race-conscious programs, 
remedial programs soon met their demise.  Now that affirmative action has suffered 
critical defeats, state actors are left with little, if any, guidance of how to promote 
social inclusion within the context of current legal parameters. 
The Ohio experience dramatically illustrates the evolution, and near demise, of 
affirmative action as well as the potential for personal liability for those state actors 
implementing statutorily required minority programs.  Strict scrutiny analysis, as 
applied by the federal district courts of Ohio, requires a direct statistical link between 
                                                                
197See F. Buddie Contracting, Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Community College, 31 F. Supp. 2d 571 
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identifiable discrimination by the governmental entity and the individuals affected by 
the discrimination, as well as an exacting burden of establishing that any race-
conscious program is narrowly tailored.  The power of the state to enforce race-
conscious remedial programs has been threatened, if not discounted absent exacting 
statistical analysis.  The statistical disparity sought by the judiciary may be 
impossible to demonstrate in light of the fact that arms of the state have enforced 
statutory set-asides in the last two decades that ensure minority participation. 
State actors are warned by recent imperatives throughout the nation and within 
the state of Ohio that enforcing race-conscious programs may be found to violate 
clearly established law, even if the state actors rely on state statute.  The potential for 
individual liability for enforcing race-conscious measures may potentially eradicate 
affirmative action.  At the least, any efforts to achieve social inclusion within the 
context of existing legal parameters should first include implementation of race-
neutral alternatives.  Any effort to include racial classification as a factor in decision-
making must be supported by strong statistical studies. 
Current legal parameters provide little guidance to state actors as to what their 
powers and duties encompass under the law.  If nothing else, the evolution of the law 
of affirmative action and equal protection establishes one truism:  “[t]he law is not 
the same at morning as at night.”198  New policies and directives must be established 
in order to continue the promotion of social inclusion given the jurisprudential shift 
toward eradication of once required affirmative action. 
                                                                
198GEORGE HERBERT, JACULA PRUDENTUM (1651). 
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